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1 ON RUSSELL’S LOGICAL ATOMISM 
 




I criticize the dominant interpretation of logical atomism. Among historians of philosophy there 
have been developments in our understanding of Russell’s logical atomism. But setting aside 
disagreements over the details, I think it may be said that the dominant interpretation as I 
describe it below remains the overall view of logical atomism held by a majority of professional 
philosophers. I here argue against the dominant interpretation. 
By way of introduction, I start with common ground between the dominant interpretation 
and my own. Logical atomists do claim that “there are many separate things”: 
 
The logic which I shall advocate is atomistic, as opposed to the monistic logic of the 
people who more or less follow Hegel. When I say that my logic is atomistic, I mean that 
I share the common-sense belief that there are many separate things; I do not regard the 
apparent multiplicity of the world as consisting merely in phases and unreal divisions of a 
single indivisible Reality. (PLA: 160)  
 
Similarly, any atoms of logical atomism are, as the name suggests, logical and not physical: 
 
The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to 
arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms. 
Some of them will be what I call “particulars”—such things as little patches of colour or 
sounds, momentary things—and some of them will be predicates or relations and so on. 
The point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom 
of physical analysis. (PLA: 161)  
 
These two quotes from the beginning of Russell’s 1918 logical atomism lectures are jointly the 
focus of multiple influential scholarly commentaries on Russell’s lectures: 
 
When they are true, atomic sentences stand for the simplest complex constituents of 
reality, which are facts consisting of objects named by logically proper names bearing the 
properties, and standing in the relations, designated by predicates. (Soames, 2014: 577, 
see also 574) 
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Russell’s lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism begin with an outline sketch of 
what he means by ‘logical atomism’: Its basic premise is that the world contains many 
different things, and that to find out what these things are we need to practise what he 
calls ‘analysis’. The idea is that almost all familiar things are in one or another way 
complex, but by analysis we can find out what simpler components these complex things 
are put together from, and if we continue this process we should end by reaching the 
ultimately simple things from which all else is composed. These are the ‘atoms’, and they 
are called ‘logical atoms’ because they are the last residue of ‘logical analysis’, which is 
said to be something quite different from physical analysis. (Bostock, 2012: 252) 
 
The ‘logical’ in the label signals that the atoms are arrived at as the ‘last residue of 
analysis’ where the analysis is logical rather than physical…Logical atomism is the view 
that in theory, if not in practice, analysis takes us down to the ultimate simples out of 
which the world is built. (Grayling, 1996: 50-51)  
  
Logical atomism…is a theory about the fundamental structure of reality and so it belongs 
to the main tradition of western metaphysics. Its central claim is that everything that we 
ever experience can be analyzed into logical atoms. [Pears then quotes Russell: “the atom 
I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis”.] (Pears, 1985: 1) 
 
The basic thesis of logical atomism…was that the world consists of simple particulars 
which have only simple qualities and stand only in simple relations to one another. (Ayer, 
1972: 103-104) 
 
I see here a pattern of taking the above two quotes from Russell’s lectures as statements of the 
essence, that is, the critical theses, of logical atomism. We should add to the above two quotes 
Russell’s views on a logically perfect language, and on acquaintance and meaning, which have 
led some to call logical atomism a “theory of meaning”: 
 
In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond one by one 
with the components of the corresponding fact, with the exception of such words as “or”, 
“not”, “if”, “then”, which have a different function. In a logically perfect language, there 
will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple 
will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from 
the words for the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component. (PLA: 
176) 
 
Soames, Urmson, and Pears state the dominant interpretation's view of such statements: 
 
It is a central aim of logical atomism to replace unanalyzed terms, predicates, and 
sentences-cum-propositions—which may stand in conceptual relations to one another—
with logically proper names, simple unanalyzable predicates, and fully analyzed 
propositions. When this aim is achieved, the conceptual properties of, and relations 
holding among, unanalyzed expressions and sentences are traced to genuinely logical 
properties of, and relations holding among, fully analyzed propositions of the agent's 
logically perfect language. (Soames, 2014: 586)  
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The shortest account of logical atomism that can be given is that the world has the 
structure of Russell’s mathematical logic…The structure of the world would thus 
resemble the structure of Principia Mathematica. That is the simple argument of the plot. 
(Urmson, 1956: 6-7) 
  
[Logical atomism does] start from the assumption that there is a general correspondence 
between language and reality, which ensures that the complete analysis of words will 
match the complete analysis of things…The idea is that, when we analyze the words in 
our vocabulary, we soon reach a point at which we find that we cannot analyze them any 
further, and so we conclude that we have reached the bottom line where unanalyzable 
words correspond to unanalyzable things. (Pears, 1985: 4-5)  
 
The dominant interpretation of logical atomism thus emerges from an elegant synthesis of 
Russell’s views. That is, logical atomism on the dominant reading merges (1) an ontological 
pluralism on which there are multiple logically independent entities, (2) a theory of meaning on 
which the referents of predicates and names are logically simple and mean their objects, and (3) 
an acquaintance epistemology that guarantees both the reference of predicates and names, and 
the truth of fully-analyzed sentences in a philosophically ideal language. To these doctrines is 
added (4) an analytic program that picks apart the meaning of logically complex ordinary words 
and traces their meaning to logically simple words. It is this interpretative synthesis that I 
describe as the reading of logical atomism as ‘a search for complexes composed of entities with 
which we have acquaintance’, or just ‘a search for acquaintance-complexes’ for short. 
This is the dominant reading of logical atomism. One reason for this is that the resulting 
view of logical atomism is admittedly extremely interesting and captivates the imagination. As 
the citations from the above influential authors indicate, it is the dominant interpretation of 
logical atomism. Now some historians reject this interpretation in its particulars, and some 
historians reject it in its essentials. Still, this interpretation seems to be the leading impression of 
logical atomism among professional philosophers today. That is, the widespread impression of 
logical atomism is that it is essentially tied to Russell’s views on acquaintance and meaning, and 
to an ontology of logic, perhaps necessarily existing, simples.  
I argue the dominant interpretation with its correlated and widespread impression of 
logical atomism is a misleading characterization of logical atomism. It is misleading because 
what is really crucial to logical atomism is logic. And not just any logic will do: a logical atomist 
needs a logic that is quite powerful, one at least that has expressive capacity sufficient to 
logically analyze and synthesize philosophical notions at least as complex as those of higher 
mathematics. A logical atomist also holds a certain view about the critical assistance of such a 
logic in philosophizing.  
I hold that a failure to make logic the essence of logical atomism produces a grossly 
mistaken history of logical atomism. That is, the textual data of the 1918 lectures and historical 
data we have about logical atomism conflicts with the dominant interpretation’s account of 
logical atomism. By modus tollens, the dominant interpretation is wrong. 
Scholars have recently made strides in criticizing the dominant interpretation. This is 
partly because scholars have critically considered what counts as a logical atomist text, and have 
given increasing significance to texts beyond the 1918 lectures in their readings of logical 
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atomism.1 And other scholars have previously criticized the dominant interpretation, as I do 
here.2 All this work is reflected in the current Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on 
logical atomism, which carefully details the historical origins and textual sources of logical 
atomism (Klement, 2016: §2).3 
 My discussion of logical atomism here builds on and extends this work. But that work 
does not go far enough. I want a clean break from the dominant interpretation. The dominant 
interpretation’s reading of logical atomism is interesting in itself. But it is just wrong. And I do 
not argue here that it is wrong on internal grounds. I mean that it does not correspond to what we 
find in the historical record and in the logical atomist texts. The dominant interpretation is a bad 
history of logical atomism. 
I proceed as follows. In the next section I present the dominant interpretation logical 
atomism, which I call ‘a search for acquaintance-complexes’. In the following two sections I 
criticize interpreting logical atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes on two grounds. 
First I argue that it badly fits the overall historical of logical atomism. Then I argue that this 
interpretation conflicts with many of Russell’s remarks in the logical atomism lectures 
themselves, including Russell’s own descriptions of logical atomism. 
 
2 The Search for Acquaintance-Complexes Reading 
 
In this section I present the dominant interpretation of Russell’s logical atomism. If we set aside 
the various minor discrepancies between authors, then we can characterize the dominant 
interpretation of logical atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes. I mean by an 
acquaintance-complex a complex constituted by simples that are objects of acquaintance. I first 
describe Russell’s notions of complex, simple, and acquaintance from March 1911 to March 
1918. I will keep this brief as many of the details will be familiar to readers. Then I will present 
the argument for the dominant interpretation of logical atomism. 
 
2.1 Russell’s Notion of a Complex  
 
In the logical atomism lectures Russell’s notion of a complex is explicated within an ontology of 
facts.4 For Russell, a fact is taken as a primitive notion to be described but not defined:  
 
When I speak of a fact—I do not propose to attempt an exact definition, but an 
explanation, so that you will know what I am talking about—I mean the kind of thing that 
makes a proposition true or false…We express a fact, for example, when we say that a 
 
1 Bostock rightly considers the logical atomist period beyond the 1918 lectures (Bostock, 2012: vi-vii). Linsky’s 
recent work on logical constructions closely follows the connections between earlier and later works, and he rightly 
links logical constructions to Russell's logical atomism (Linsky, 2003: 372; 2014, §1). 
2 Both Landini (2007: §2.1; 2011: 162-163) and Maclean (2014: Chapter 8) criticize the dominant interpretation of 
logical atomism. 
3 (Galaugher, 2013: Chapters 1-2) provides critical historical context for Russell’s rejection of the doctrine of 
internal relations. 
4 “We will give the name “a complex” to any such object as “a in the relation R to b” or “a having the quality q” or 
“a and b and c standing in the relation S.” Broadly speaking, a complex is anything which occurs in the universe and 
is not simple.” (PM2: 47) 
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certain thing has a certain property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing… 
(PLA: 163-164)5  
 
Russell’s facts, being taken as primitive, are not for him amendable to definition using other 
terms. But the sort of entity Russell means is as comprehendible as any philosophical notion. 
And Russell describes facts somewhat further in the 1918 lectures (and in his 1914 book—see 
footnotes). He states that they have the following four features: facts (a) are objective, (b) are the 
sort of entity that makes a statement true or false,6 (c) have constituents, and (d) have various 
logical forms: 
 
a. It is important to observe that facts belong to the objective world. They are not created by 
our thoughts or beliefs except in special cases. (PLA: 164)7  
 
b. When we speak falsely it is an objective fact that makes what we say false, and it is an 
objective fact which makes what we say true when we speak truly. (PLA: 164)8  
  
c.  The things in the world have various properties and stand in various relations to each 
other. That they have these properties and relations are facts, and the things and their 
qualities and relations are quite clearly in some sense or other components of the facts 
that have those qualities or relations. (PLA: 171)9  
 
d. There are a great many different kinds of facts… (PLA: 164)  
There are, of course, a good many forms that facts may have, a strictly infinite number, 
and I do not wish you to suppose that I pretend to deal with all of them. (PLA: 191)10  
 
Russell’s examples of facts in 1918 include it is raining, Socrates is dead, gravitation varies 
inversely as the square of the distance, two and two are four, this is white, and this is to the left 
of that (PLA: 163, 176).11  
Now facts are not all alike in Russell’s view: facts are rather of different sorts and are 
distinct in virtue of either their constituents12 or their form (OKEW: 53 footnote 1). For example, 
the logical atomism lectures discuss atomic facts, of which there arguably two species: positive 
facts and negative facts. Now as Russell tells us in his 1918 lectures, he entertained negative 
 
5 “When I speak of a “fact,” I do not mean one of the simple things of the world; I mean that a certain thing has a 
certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation.” (OKEW: 51) 
6 A fact need not make a statement true. Arguably, there would still be logical facts even if there were no truths. This 
does not change that facts are the sort of thing that could make something true. 
7 “The fact itself is objective, and independent of our thought or opinion about it; but the assertion is something 
which involves thought, and may be either true or false.” (OKEW: 52) 
8 “Thus atomic facts are what determine whether atomic propositions are to be asserted or denied.” (OKEW: 52) 
9 “Now a fact, in this sense, is never simple, but always has two or more constituents.” (OKEW: 51) 
10 “Atomic propositions, although, like facts, they may have any one of an infinite number of forms, are only one 
kind of propositions. All other kinds are more complicated.” (OKEW: 51) 
11 His examples in 1914 are this is red, this is before that, Napoleon was ambitious, Napoleon married Josephine, A 
is jealous of B on account of C, Charles I was executed, and Socrates is a man (OKEW: 51, 53, 57). 
12 “The constituents of facts, in the sense in which we are using the word “fact,” are not other facts, but things and 
qualities or relations.” (OKEW: 51) The sense of ‘fact’ here is specifically atomic facts. 
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facts in 1914, and by 1918 he is inclined, with hesitation, to accept them (PLA: 187, 189-190)13 
Russell heavily qualifies even this tentative endorsement of negative facts: “It is a difficult 
question. I really only ask that you should not dogmatize. I do not say positively that there are, 
but there may be.” (PLA: 187).14 As another example, there are arguably also facts that are not 
atomic, like general facts and existence facts, and also belief facts and even molecular facts.  
We need not delve into which of these Russell posited in the lectures and which he 
rejected. What we have so far as an explication of Russell’s notion of a complex, as accounted 
for through his notion of a fact, is enough for our purposes here. 
 
2.2 Russell’s Notion of a Simple 
 
In Lecture I, Russell offers examples logically simple entities (“logical atoms”): 
 
Some of them [the logical atoms] will be what I call ‘particulars’—such things as little 
patches of colour or sounds, momentary things—and some of them will be predicates or 
relations and so on. (PLA: 161) 
 
So we have two varieties of logically simple entities: particulars and relations.15 He defines 
particular as “terms of relations in atomic facts.” (PLA: 177)16 He immediately comments on 
this definition to clarify that this definition is “purely logical” and that logicians do not care 
whether there are any particulars at all.17 He adds they are logically independent: 
 
Particulars have this peculiarity, among the sort of objects you have to take account of in 
an inventory of the world, that each of them stands entirely alone and is completely self-
subsistent. (PLA: 201)18  
 
The notion of logical independence is critical to Russell’s notion of a simple: it is essential to 
being a simple that it is logically independent of all other entities. As he says in 1911, complexes 
presupposes simples, but not conversely (AR: 134). Simples also exist in logical independence of 
each other.19 Russell further suggests that the only way in which one entity depends on another is 
 
13 I once thought that Russell flatly posited them in his 1918 lectures. Perović (this volume) has shown that the issue 
is more complicated than I had originally supposed. I thank Perović for changing my mind on this point. 
14 Now Russell does posit negative facts in his 1919 “On Propositions”: “Thus facts, and forms of facts, have two 
opposite qualities, positive and negative.” (OP: 280) But negative facts are not endorsed in his 1924 “Logical 
Atomism”, and he argues against them in the 1940s. 
15 “Russell sometimes uses “monadic relation” for quality, and he sometimes uses ‘predicate’ for quality; he is 
explicit about this practice (PLA: 177). 
16 “Particulars have the purely logical properties of substances, but do not have their metaphysical properties. That 
is to say, particulars can only be either the subjects of predicates or the terms of relations.” (AR: 135) 
17 “It remains to be investigated what particulars you actually can find in the world, if any. The whole question of 
what particulars you actually find in the world is a purely empirical one which does not interest the logician as 
such.” (PLA: 177) 
18 “From the logical point of view, any simple existence is independent of any other, and the only dependence is that 
of the complex on the simple.” (AR: 135) 
19 “It is analytic, because it claims that the existence of the complex depends on the existence of the simple, and not 
vice versa, and that the constituent of a complex, taken as a constituent, is absolutely identical with itself as it is 
when we do not consider its relations. This philosophy is therefore an atomic philosophy.” (AR: 133) 
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that one is a part of another.20 This is distinctive of simples. All of these remarks about logical 
independence equally apply to particulars and to relations.  
From 1911 to 1918, Russell accounts for relations through an ontology of universals (AR: 
133) He discusses universals extensively in (PLA: Lectures II-III). In 1911 he calls known 
universals concepts. It is not quite clear that he keeps this locution in the 1918 lectures, though 
he sometimes describes as “concepts” what are likely universals, including “the concept of 
humanity” (PLA: 231). Russell also says in a 1960 interview with Woodrow Wyatt that logical 
atomism is concerned with breaking apart “ideas out of which a thing is built up.”21 
In this same period, Russell accounts for logical particulars—in the sense of logically-
independent particulars, not in the sense of logical entities—through an ontology of sense-data. 
In 1911 he describes particulars that are known as sense-data.22 In his 1914 “The Relation of 
Sense-Data to Physics”, Russell indicates that sense-data are logically independent in the 
required sense.23 This mindset seems to carry over into the 1918 lectures, as he describes 
particulars as “little patches of colour or sounds” above. 
We need not adjudicate these issues over Russell’s ontology here. The vital point is that a 
simple is logically independent of all other entities while all complexes are composed of them, 
and that simples are to be designated by the terms of a logically perspicuous language. Russell 
eschews giving them essential characteristics beyond such logical features. He writes: 
 
You will note that this philosophy is the philosophy of logical atomism. Every simple 
entity is an atom. One must not suppose that atoms need persist in time, or that they need 
occupy space: these atoms are purely logical. (AR: 134) 
 
The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to 
arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical 
atoms…The point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis and 
not the atom of physical analysis. (PLA: 161) 
 
Whatever other features they logically may have, it is simples in Russell’s logical sense that are 
the atoms of logical atomism.24  
 
2.3 Russell’s Notion of Acquaintance 
 
20 “The only way, so far as I know, in which one thing can be logically dependent upon another is when the other is 
part of the one.” (OKEW: 74) 
21 “Woodrow Wyatt: What kind of philosopher would you say you are? Russell: Well, the only label I’ve ever 
given myself is logical atomist, but I’m not very keen on the label. I’ve rather avoided labels. Wyatt: What does that 
mean? A logical atomist. Russell: It means, in my mind, that the way to get at the nature of any subject matter 
you're looking at is analysis—and that you can analyze until you get to things that can’t be analyzed any further and 
those would be logical atoms. I call them logical atoms because they’re not little bits of matter. They’re the ideas, so 
to speak, ideas out of which a thing is built up.” (Wyatt, 1960: 15) This forty-second interview segment is viewable 
on the Internet Archive at the 5:55-6:35 mark: https://archive.org/details/BertrandRussellDiscussesPhilosophy. 
22 “...particulars which are known are called sense-data.” (AR: 135) 
23 “Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware. It does not contain the subject as 
a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do. The existence of the sense-datum is therefore not logically dependent 
upon that of the subject...” (RSDP: 9) 
24 “You will note that this philosophy is the philosophy of logical atomism. Every simple entity is an atom. One 
must not suppose that atoms need persist in time, or that they need occupy space: these atoms are purely logical.” 
(AR: 135) 
P a g e  8 | 24 
 
 
Russell describes acquaintance as follows:25  
 
I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that 
object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself. (KAKD: 149)   
 
Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation between the mind and 
something other than the mind… (PoP: 66-67) 
 
We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, 
without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. (PoP: 
73)  
 
This last point is worth stressing. Russell explicitly denies that acquaintance relations involve 
judgements.26 Acquaintance is moreover presupposed in all other cognitive relationships.27  
The field of acquaintance in Russell’s theory includes the following: (1) sense-data, (2) 
memory-data, (3) introspection-data, including both mental facts like my seeing the sun and my 
desiring food, and feelings like those of pain and pleasure, (4) possibly, our own Self, though 
Russell is unsure of this, and (5) universals, including both sensible properties like whiteness and 
blackness, and abstract properties like diversity. Russell writes:  
 
We have acquaintance [1] in sensation with the data of the outer senses, and [2] in 
introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense—thoughts, feelings, 
desires, etc.; we have acquaintance [3] in memory with things which have been data 
either of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, [4] it is probable, though not 
certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is aware of things or has 
desires towards things…we also have acquaintance [5] with what we shall call 
universals, that is to say, general ideas, such as whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, and so 
on. (PoP: 80-81, see also 75-77)  
 
There are again many interesting issues involved in Russell’s acquaintance epistemology. But we 
have enough to grasp the argument for the dominant reading of logical atomism. 
  
2.4 The Argument for the Dominant Reading 
 
Logical atomism as the search for acquaintance-complexes, then, is the philosophical program of 
searching for complexes composed of entities with which we are acquainted. J. O. Urmson aptly 
summarizes this interpretation of logical atomism: 
 
 
25 I cite Problems because Russell's descriptions there are far more detailed than his description in the logical 
atomism lectures. Russell abandoned acquaintance relations by 1919 (OP: 294-295; LA: 167). 
26 “When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the 
sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is 
simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation.” (KAKD: 148) 
27 “All cognitive relations—attention, sensation, memory, imagination, believing, disbelieving, etc.—presuppose 
acquaintance.” (CPBR 7: 5). 
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In the period from 1905 to 1919 Russell attempted to give a reductionist account of 
empirical knowledge; the basic materials were sense data; the methodological maxim was 
to replace inferred entities by logical constructions whenever possible, and the theory of 
descriptions was the main logical tool. (Urmson, 1969: 510) 
 
On this reading Russell’s logical atomism depends on both an epistemology with a theory of 
acquaintance and an ontology including entities with which we metaphysically can stand in 
acquaintance relations. Let us consider these two doctrines in turn.  
A logical construction, as the name suggests, is constructed from something. Russell’s 
language is frequently suggestive of constructing logical complexes from simples.28 This is why 
Urmson mentions “basic materials”. Now the materials are entities, but what makes ‘basic’ is 
also their epistemological status. This is where logical simples enter into logical atomism on the 
dominant interpretation of logical atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes: logical 
simples, on that reading, are both the epistemological and logical foundation, really the essence, 
of logical atomism. 
Followers of the dominant interpretation, following Russell’s remark above, thus 
understand logical atomism as committed to logical simples, namely, particulars, qualities, and 
relations (Pears, 1985: 2). D. F. Pears writes, “[Logical atomism’s] central claim is that 
everything we ever experience can be analyzed into logical atoms.” (Pears, 1985: 1) This 
commitment arises for epistemological and logical reasons.  
The epistemological reasons are as follows. The scope of experience is limited to objects 
and facts with which we have acquaintance in Russell’s sense.29 This interpretative claim is 
based on Russell’s formulation of a “fundamental principle” of analysis:30 
 
All analysis is only possible in regard to what is complex, and it always depends, in the 
last analysis, upon direct acquaintance with the objects which are the meanings of certain 
simple symbols. (PLA: 173)  
 
The fundamental principle forces upon us an identification of logical atoms and epistemological 
atoms. This brings us to Russell’s further claim about the structures of both logical analysus and 
of epistemological justification:  
 
All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon 
acquaintance as its foundation. (PoP: 73; see also 175-176)  
 
All analysis is only possible in regard to what is complex, and it always depends, in the 
last analysis, upon direct acquaintance with the objects which are the meanings of certain 
simple symbols. (PLA: 173) 
 
28 “In a philosophy of logical atomism one might suppose that the first thing to do would be to discover the kinds of 
atoms out of which logical structures are composed. But I do not think that is quite the first thing; it is one of the 
early things, but not quite the first.” (PLA: 169) “I have been speaking hitherto of what it is not necessary to assume 
as part of the ultimate constituents of the world. But logical constructions, like all other constructions, require 
materials, and it is time to turn to the positive question, as to what these materials are to be.” (LA: 169)  
29 “Russellian analyses proceed by way of definitions, terminate with indefinables, and, at that point, base 
themselves on acquaintance.” (Pears, 1985: 9) 
30 “The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which 
we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.” (PoP: 91) 
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In Problems, Russell holds an acquaintance epistemology, the view that non-inferential 
justification is given by acquaintance, acquaintance being a relation of direct awareness that is 
not either conceptual, judgmental, or representational.31 Russell also affirms epistemological 
foundationalism, the view that all justification chains terminate in non-inferential justification. 
These two claims require epistemological atoms—particulars and relations for Russell—with 
which we have acquaintance at the base of our justificatory structure. Russell also claims that 
logical analysis necessarily terminates, if it does, with logical atoms. Crucially, these logical 
atoms must be objects of acquaintance. We thus have an identification of logical atoms and 
epistemological atoms: logical atoms are just the entities and facts upon which all knowledge 
epistemologically depends; conversely, epistemological atoms are just the logically simple 
entities that are the constituents of facts. Thus Russell adopted logical atomism through an 
independently-motivated “fundamental principle” that in turn led to a foundationalism about 
analysis: this manifested itself in the view that all simple symbols comprehended by a speaker 
mean objects of acquaintance—a simple symbol being “a symbol whose parts are not symbols.” 
(PLA: 173) Pears writes: 
 
So when analysis could proceed no further, he appealed to acquaintance or direct 
experience…Russellian analyses proceed by way of definitions, terminate with 
indefinables, and, at that point, base themselves upon acquaintance. (Pears, 1985: 8) 
 
This is the first half of logical atomism understood as the search for acquaintance-complexes. 
The other half is an ontology inclusive of objects of acquaintance upon which we can ground 
empirical knowledge. These are to be the logical atoms of logical atomism. 
Now a logical atomist needs atoms, for the above reasons concerning the possibility of 
knowledge, and also because their eponym is awkward if there are no atoms. Pears writes: 
 
An atom is something indivisible or not further analyzable. A logical atomist, therefore, 
needs to show not only that the divisions traceable in logic correspond to real divisions in 
the nature of things, but also that the two corresponding processes of analysis do not 
continue indefinitely. If Russell is right, there must be a point at which words and things 
will be found to be not further analyzable. (Pears, 1985: 2) 
 
On the dominant interpretation the need for atoms is imposed by the need for the analysis of 
words to terminate along with the thesis that there is a close correspondence between the analysis 
of the world and the analysis of language.32 As we saw above Russell claims analysis depends on 
a complex being capable of separation into components. The components of facts will moreover 
be logically independent of each other. Russell writes: 
 
 
31 Paul J. Hager’s analysis diagrams are useful in grasping the options here; Hager’s foundationalist diagram 
captures the dominant interpretation’s notion of Russellian analysis (Hager, 1994: 48, Figure 4.3). 
32 “The theoretical reason for postulating simple particulars is that, when a complex singular expression is fully 
analyzed, there must be one or more particulars to carry the qualities and relations mentioned in its analysis, and 
these particulars will be simple because all qualities and relations will have been stripped from them.” (Pears, 1972: 
37) 
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It is quite clear that in that sense there is a possibility of cutting up a fact into component 
parts, of which one component may be altered without altering the others, and one 
component may occur in certain other facts though not in all other facts. I want to make it 
clear, to begin with, that there is a sense in which facts can be analyzed. (PLA: 172)  
 
And as we saw, in his 1911 “Analytic Realism” he says complexes presuppose simples but not 
conversely (AR: 134). And Russell holds that a simple is logically independent of every other 
simple. This applies both to simple words and simple objects. Simple objects are logically 
independent of each other. Each atom logically could be the only entity that exists.33 And 
expressions whose meaning is some simple object will be simple symbols whose meanings can 
be understood independently of understanding the meaning of any other word.34 So for a logical 
atomist on the dominant reading, there is necessarily a close correspondence between words and 
objects: 
 
We may lay down the following provisional definitions: 
That the components of a proposition are the symbols we must understand in order to 
understand the proposition; 
That the components of the fact which makes a proposition true or false, as the case may 
be, are the meanings of the symbols which we must understand in order to understand the 
proposition. (PLA: 175) 
 
Moreover, simple words will be understood, necessarily and sufficiently, by acquaintance.35 
Russell’s example of a simple word is the word ‘red’: he argues ‘red’, unlike complex symbols, 
cannot be understood except through acquaintance with red objects.36 And by the close 
correspondence of language and the world, given that there are simple symbols like ‘red’ there 
are simple entities that are the meaning of such simple symbols.37 
So one might use the text of the lectures to reason to an ontology of necessarily-existing 
simple objects. There are a number of problems with that argument that have been much-
discussed.38 But the point that matters for present purposes is the sketch of the dominant 
 
33 “That is to say, each particular that there is in the world does not in any way logically depend upon any other 
particulars. Each one might happen to be the whole universe; it is a merely empirical fact that this is not the case. 
There is no reason why you should not have a universe consisting of one particular and nothing else. That is a 
peculiarity of particulars.” (PLA: 179, see also 181). 
34 “The acquaintance with the simpler is presupposed in the understanding of the more complex, but the logic that I 
should wish to combat maintains that in order thoroughly to know any one thing, you must know all its relations and 
all its qualities, all the propositions in fact in which that thing is mentioned; and you deduce from that that the world 
is an interdependent whole. It is on a basis of that sort that the logic of monism develops.” (PLA: 181) 
35 “In the same way, in order to understand a name for a particular, the only thing necessary is to be acquainted with 
that particular. When you are acquainted with that particular, you have a full, adequate, and complete understanding 
of the name, and no further information is required. No further information as to the facts that are true of that 
particular would enable you to have a fuller understanding of the meaning of the name.” (PLA: 179) 
36 “This characteristic, that you can understand a proposition through the understanding of its component words, is 
absent from the component words when those words express something simple. Take the word “red”, for 
example…You cannot understand the meaning of the word “red” except through seeing red things.” (PLA: 173) 
37 “Russell used the empirical argument and claimed, in the spirit of Hume, that, when we find that we cannot push 
the analysis of words any further, we can plant a flag recording the discovery of genuine logical atoms.” (Pears, 
1985: 5) 
38 Confer (Jager, 1972: §6.14; Sainsbury, 1979: §II.3; Pears, 1985: 3-4; Hager, 1994: Chapter 4; Linsky, 2003: 384-
386; Bostock, 2012: §14.1). Russell’s response to a question from H. Wildon Carr at the end of Lecture II indicates 
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interpretation of logical atomism as the search for acquaintance-complexes. This reading 
proposes an intriguing union of epistemological theory of acquaintance and of an ontological 
theory with simples, all interwoven with a theory of meaning on which the structure of all facts 
would be made logically perspicuous in an ideal language. I submit that this captivating idea 
remains the dominant reading of logical atomism among professional philosophers. Yet I argue 
that this reading of logical atomism does not make logic central to logical atomism: 
consequently, it poorly fits the history of logical atomism and the text in the 1918 lectures. 
 
3 The Logico-Mathematical Origins of Logical Atomism 
 
Viewing Russell’s logical atomism as the search for acquaintance-complexes poorly fits the 
historical record. In particular it fails to explain three historical facts: (1) nineteenth-century 
mathematical developments, especially the logical work of Peano and Frege and the work of 
Cantor, are central to logical atomism; (2) logic is central to logical atomism; and (3) logical 
atomism is supposed to be what Russell calls a ‘scientific philosophy.’ Let us start with (1). 
Russell’s intellectual autobiography, My Philosophical Development, begins as follows:  
 
There is one major division in my philosophical work: in the years 1899-1900 I adopted 
the philosophy of logical atomism and the technique of Peano in mathematical logic. 
(MPD: 9) 
 
There is good reason to be suspicious of Russell’s remark. For starters, the date is debatable.39 
We have no evidence Russell used the phrase ‘logical atomism’ before 1911: indeed, Russell’s 
first use of ‘logical atomism’ was in French.40 So we should critically examine what led Russell 
in 1959 to call himself a ‘logical atomist’ over a decade before he first used the French 
equivalent of the phrase ‘logical atomism’.  
A clue to Russell’s meaning comes from the date plus the phrase ‘the technique of Peano 
in mathematical logic’.41 Russell in 1901 wrote an essay explaining the importance to philosophy 
of recent work on mathematics, especially work on mathematical logic by Peano and others. This 
essay was his 1901 “Recent Work in the Philosophy of Mathematics”.42 
 
Russell is open to analysis having no end (PLA: 180). Likewise Russell's 1924 essay “Logical Atomism” allows for 
the same (LA: 173-174). In both cases Russell notes that that his considered view is that complexes are composed of 
simples, and that positing simples is inessential to logical atomism. 
39 Russell broke with Neo-Hegelian philosophy in mid-1898 (Griffin, 1991, 181). Perhaps Russell means to date his 
firm adoption of logical atomism to the 1899 publication of Moore’s “The Nature of Judgment” in Mind. More 
likely, as we see below he means to include his subsequent adoption of the doctrine of external relations and of 
Peano’s logic. 
40 So far as we know Russell coined the phrase ‘logical atomism’ in his 1911 “Analytic Realism”, which first 
appeared in English in 1992 (AR: 135). So strictly-speaking, as the article was originally published in French, he 
first used the phrase ‘atomisme logique’ (AR: 412). 
41 The other conjunct relates to his rejecting the doctrine of internal relations: “Moreover, by the rejection of à priori 
constructions the way is opened for philosophy to become inductive, and to begin the patient cooperative 
accumulation of results by which the triumphs of science have been achieved.” (BoR: 131) Klement concisely 
details the importance of this rejection (Klement, 2016, §2.1). The importance of this is also missed by reading 
logical atomism as the search for acquaintance-complexes, so a parallel criticism could be made that the traditional 
interpretation misses the importance of external relations for Russell's logical atomism. I ignore that here due to 
space constraints and focus narrowly on the importance of logic. 
42 He retitled the essay “Mathematics and the Metaphysicians” in a 1917 reprinting: “The essay “Mathematics and 
the Metaphysicians” was written in 1901, and appeared in an American magazine, The International Monthly, under 
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Most of essay concerns philosophers continuing longstanding controversies about, among 
other things, the nature of continuity, space, time, infinity, points, and number. Nineteenth-
century mathematicians in contrast undertook technical work that dissolved many of these 
controversies. Philosophers contented themselves with a priori refutations of mathematics. 
Mathematicians rolled up their sleeves and labored to clarify mathematical notions so as to make 
mathematics intelligible. Russell stresses that the mathematicians were in the right. 
The piece consists in a pattern repeated throughout the essay. The pattern is a discussion 
of some philosopher’s argument against a mathematical notion, followed by a summary of some 
mathematician’s new definition that shows the argument was founded on a faulty and confused 
view of that notion. Russell’s discussion of infinity nicely illustrates the pattern. Let us consider 
it. 
As Russell tells the story, philosophers had for centuries held infinite numbers “were self-
contradictory”; but it seemed obvious that there are infinite numbers like the number of whole 
numbers (RWPM: 372). The purported self-contradiction arose from the following fact: an 
infinitely-large collection is sometimes equal in size to an infinitely-large proper sub-collection 
(RWPM: 373). For example, the collection of whole numbers is equal in cardinality to the 
collection of even whole numbers even though the second collection is a proper sub-collection of 
the first. This contradicts the seemingly-obvious thesis that a sub-collection s is smaller than any 
collection S of which s is a proper part (RWPM: 373). But mathematicians like Cantor and 
Dedekind showed that the violation of this thesis that the proper part has a smaller size than the 
whole, far from being contradictory, can actually be used to define infinite numbers (RWPM: 
372-373).43  
Russell reconsiders philosophers’ past discussions of infinity in light of mathematicians’ 
recent work, especially Cantor’s. He notes metaphysicists had failed to solve conceptual 
difficulties associated with the infinite. Mathematicians in contrast dissolved those difficulties: 
 
Thus on the subject of infinity it is impossible to avoid conclusions which at first sight 
appear paradoxical, and this is the reason why so many philosophers have supposed that 
there were inherent contradictions in the infinite. But a little practice enables one to grasp 
the true principles of Cantor’s doctrine, and to acquire new and better instincts as to the 
true and the false. The oddities then become no odder than the people at the antipodes, 
who used to be thought impossible because they would find it so inconvenient to stand on 
their heads. (RWPM: 376) 
 
So first we have purported contradictions that plagued the philosophy of infinity for centuries. 
Then we have technical, mathematical work in the nineteenth-century dissolving the purported 
contradictions. Facility with the new mathematics of infinity was sufficient to dissolve entirely 
philosophical debate over infinity, at least among those familiar with the new mathematics of 
infinity. Russell believed that this fruitful pattern was typical of a general development in all 
philosophy of mathematics: 
 
 
the title “Recent Work in Philosophy of Mathematics.”” (MaL: v) Another 1901 essay covering similar ground, 
“Recent Italian Work on the Foundations of Mathematics”, remained unpublished until 1993 (RIWFM: 350-351). 
43 Cantor and Dedekind did not mean concrete part. Cantor and Dedekind used the idea of bijections (one-to-one 
correspondences). Using this idea, we can say a collection is infinite means there exists a bijection from itself to a 
proper sub-collection of itself. 
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In the whole philosophy of mathematics, which used to be as full of doubt as any other 
part of philosophy, order and certainty have replaced the confusion and hesitation which 
formerly reigned. Philosophers, of course, have not yet discovered this fact, and continue 
to write on such subjects in the old way. But mathematicians, at least in Italy [Peano and 
his school], have now the power of treating the principles of mathematics in an exact and 
masterly manner, by means of which the certainty of mathematics extends also to 
mathematical philosophy. Hence many of the topics which used to be placed among the 
great mysteries—for example, the natures of infinity, of continuity, of space, time and 
motion—are now no longer in any degree open to doubt or discussion. Those who wish 
to know the nature of these things need only read the works of such men as Peano or 
Georg Cantor; they will find there exact and indubitable expositions of all these quondam 
mysteries. (RWPM, 369) 
 
Russell further believes that the introduction of “order and certainty” in the philosophy of 
infinity can be utilized not just in the philosophy of mathematics, but in all of philosophy. He 
hopes that the spread of logical and mathematical techniques in philosophy over other areas of 
controversy will spread order and certainty throughout philosophy. His 1901 essay ends with this 
recommendation to let logic develop as freely as possible with the strong conviction that logic 
stands to bring “exactitude and certainty” to all of philosophy: 
 
What is now required is to give the greatest possible development to mathematical logic, 
to allow to the full the importance of relations, and then to found upon this secure basis a 
new philosophical logic, which may hope to borrow some of the exactitude and certainty 
of its mathematical foundation. If this can be successfully accomplished, there is every 
reason to hope that the near future will be as great an epoch in pure philosophy as the 
immediate past has been in the principles of mathematics. (RWPM: 379) 
 
His belief in the resolving power of logic for longstanding philosophical problems is then 
recorded quite early. And nineteenth-century mathematics on his philosophy had a powerful 
impact on his philosophy. Indeed, these features of his concluding recommendation animate 
Russell’s philosophical works thereafter: he urges giving the widest scope to mathematical logic 
and the logic of relations in the hopes that such development will produce a new logic; a new 
logic in turn will induce a ‘great epoch’ in philosophy brought about by the emergence of what 
Russell calls ‘scientific philosophy’. What Russell meant in 1959 by connecting logical atomism 
to “the technique of Peano” was this: 19th-century mathematics—its development of piecemeal 
technical work within a powerful logic, followed by the dissolution of philosophical problems—
was the developmental model for logical atomist philosophy.  
The centrality of nineteenth-century mathematics to logical atomism is the historical fact 
(1) above. And I argue below that this historical fact is unexplained by the dominant reading of 
logical atomism. But let us first consider the impact of nineteenth-century mathematics on 
Russell, which brings us to what I denoted by (2) and (3) above: after his encounter with the 
work of Peano, (2) logic became central to his logical atomist philosophy and (3) logical 
atomism was to be a ‘scientific philosophy’. Both (2) and (3) occur throughout Russell’s writings 
after 1901, and especially from 1911 to 1924. Here is a collection of occurrences of (2) and (3) in 
Russell’s works from 1911 to 1945: 
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The true method, in philosophy as in science, should be inductive, meticulous, respectful 
of detail, and should reject the belief that it is the duty of each philosopher to solve all 
problems by himself. It is this method which has inspired analytic realism [that is, 
“logical atomism” (AR: 135)], and it is the only method, if I am not mistaken, with which 
philosophy will succeed in obtaining results as solid as those obtained in science. (AR: 
139)  
   
Philosophy, from the earliest times, has made greater claims, and achieved fewer results, 
than any other branch of learning…I believe that the time has now arrived when this 
unsatisfactory state of things can be brought to an end…The problems and the method of 
philosophy have, I believe, been misconceived by all schools, many of its traditional 
problems being insoluble with our means of knowledge, while other more neglected but 
not less important problems can, by a more patient and adequate method, be solved with 
all the precision and certainty to which the most advanced sciences have attained… 
[Logical atomism] represents, I believe, the same kind of advance as was introduced by 
Galileo: the substitution of piecemeal, detailed, and verifiable results for large untested 
generalities recommended only by a certain appeal to imagination. (OKEW: 3-4) 
   
The philosophy, therefore, which is to be genuinely inspired by the scientific spirit, must 
deal with somewhat dry and abstract matters, and must not hope to find an answer to the 
practical problems of life. (OKEW: 29)44 
   
It is in this way that the study of logic becomes the central study in philosophy: it gives 
the method of research in philosophy, just as mathematics gives the method in physics. 
(OKEW: 239) 
 
It is not results, but methods, that can be transferred with profit from the sphere of the 
special sciences to the sphere of philosophy. (SMP: 57)45  
 
First, the detailed scientific investigation of nature does not presuppose any such general 
laws as its results are found to verify. Apart from particular observations, science need 
presuppose nothing except the general principles of logic, and these principles are not 
laws of nature, for they are merely hypothetical, and apply not only to the actual world 
but to whatever is possible. (SMP: 61) 
 
 
44 Russell, at least by 1914, denied that ethics belonged to scientific philosophy: “Human ethical notions, as Chuang 
Tzu perceived, are essentially anthropocentric, and involve, when used in metaphysics, an attempt, however veiled, 
to legislate for the universe on the basis of the present desires of men. In this way they interfere with that receptivity 
to fact which is the essence of the scientific attitude towards the world.” (SMP: 63) Russell admits, “the importance 
or value, within its own sphere,” of ethically-inspired philosophy, he concludes, “The scientific philosophy, 
therefore, which only aims at understanding the world and not directly at any other improvement of human life, 
cannot take account of ethical notions without being turned aside from that submission to fact which is the essence 
of the scientific temper.” (SMP: 64) Thus he held that ethical philosophy is disjoint from logical atomist philosophy. 
Here I leave open the consistency of ethical philosophy with logical atomist philosophy, and so of logical atomist 
ethics. 
45 In this work Russell affirms logical atomism: “The philosophy which I wish to advocate may be called logical 
atomism or absolute pluralism…” (SMP: 65) 
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A scientific philosophy such as I wish to recommend will be piecemeal and tentative like 
other sciences; above all, it will be able to invent hypotheses which, even if they are not 
wholly true, will remain fruitful after the necessary corrections have been made. The 
possibility of successive approximations to the truth is, more than anything else, the 
source of the triumphs of science, and to transfer this possibility to philosophy is to 
ensure a progress in method whose importance it would be almost impossible to 
exaggerate. (SMP: 66)46 
   
The adoption of scientific method in philosophy, if I am not mistaken, compels us to 
abandon the hope of solving many of the more ambitious and humanly interesting 
problems in philosophy. Some of these it relegates, though with little expectation of a 
successful solution, to special sciences, others it shows to be such as our capacities are 
incapable of solving. But there remain a large number of the recognized problems in 
philosophy in regard to which the method advocated gives all the advantages of division 
into distinct questions, of tentative, partial, and progressive advance, and of appeal to 
principles with which, independently of temperament, all competent students must agree. 
The failure of philosophy hitherto has been due in the main to haste and ambition: 
patience and modesty, here as in other sciences, will open the road to solid and durable 
progress. (SMP: 73)  
 
Philosophical knowledge, if what we have been saying is correct, does not differ 
essentially from scientific knowledge…and the results of obtained by philosophy are not 
radically different from those reached in science. (OoP: 308)47  
 
I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such 
methods [as logical analysis] that it must be sought… (HWP: 862)48  
 
Russell here takes logic to be central to philosophy, logical atomism. Note that his suggestions 
for the development of logic are modeled on the development of nineteenth-century mathematics 
as described in his 1901 “Recent Work on the Philosophy of Mathematics.” And when Russell 
describes the scientific philosophy, that is, philosophy as distinguished from empirical science, 
what he says describes just logic: 
 
…certain characteristics may be noted as distinguishing the province of 
philosophy from that of the special sciences.  
  In the first place a philosophical proposition must be general…I do believe that a 
philosophical proposition must be applicable to everything that exists or may 
exist…What I do maintain is that there are general propositions which may be asserted of 
each individual thing, such as the propositions of logic…The philosophy which I wish to 
advocate may be called logical atomism or absolute pluralism, because, while 
 
46 Confer also his 1904 review of Moore’s Principia Ethica: “…philosophy will never advance, until the notion is 
dispelled, that sweeping general principles can excuse the patient attention to detail which, here as elsewhere, can 
alone lead to the discovery of truth." (TMG: 575)  
47 Russell earlier states, “…I call the philosophy which I advocate ‘logical atomism’.” (OoP: 259) 
48 I think Russell is referring to his logical atomist philosophy here. He has just illustrated on the previous page “the 
utility of philosophical syntax” using his theory of definite descriptions (HWP: 859). 
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maintaining that there are many things, it denies that there is a whole composed of those 
things. We shall see, therefore, that philosophical propositions, instead of being 
concerned with the whole of things collectively, are concerned with all things 
distributively; and not only must they be concerned with all things, but they must be 
concerned with such properties of all things as do not depend upon the accidental nature 
of the things that there happen to be, but are true of any possible world, independently of 
such facts as can only be discovered by our senses. 
This brings us to a second characteristic of philosophical propositions, namely, 
that they must be a priori. A philosophical proposition must be such as can be neither 
proved nor disproved by empirical evidence. […] 
We may sum up these two characteristics of philosophical propositions by saying 
that philosophy is the science of the possible. But this statement unexplained is liable to 
be misleading, since it may be thought that the possible is something other than the 
general, whereas in fact the two are indistinguishable. 
Philosophy, if what has been said is correct, becomes indistinguishable from logic 
as that word has now come to be used. (SMP: 64-65)  
 
Now one might argue Russell’s emphasis on mathematical logic as the way to make philosophy 
scientific is a general feature of Russell's philosophy after his discovery of Peano. That need not 
imply that logic is central to logical atomism. So logic need not be central to logical atomism, 
except in that logical atomism is part of philosophy. Russell flatly contradicts that suggestion. He 
explicitly makes logic a central feature of logical atomism. He affirms that logical atomism 
emerged from the new mathematical logic both in his logical atomism lectures and in his 1924 
“Logical Atomism”: 
 
The kind of philosophy that I wish to advocate, which I call Logical Atomism, is one 
which has forced itself upon me in the course of thinking about the philosophy of 
mathematics, although I should find it hard to say exactly how far there is a definite 
logical connexion between the two…In the present lectures, I shall try to set forth in a 
sort of outline, rather briefly and rather unsatisfactorily, a kind of logical doctrine which 
seems to me to result from the philosophy of mathematics—not exactly logically, but as 
what emerges as one reflects: a certain kind of logical doctrine, and on the basis of this a 
certain kind of metaphysic. (PLA: 160)  
 
Also I found myself driven to pluralism. Analysis of mathematical propositions 
persuaded me that they could not be explained as even partial truths unless one admitted 
pluralism and the reality of relations…I began to think it probably that philosophy had 
erred in adopting heroic remedies for intellectual difficulties, and that solutions were to 
be found merely by greater care and accuracy. (LA: 162-163)  
 
Russell says that logical atomism, as he understands his own view, is inspired by the positive 
achievements of Peano, Cantor, Weierstrass, Dedekind, and Frege using the new mathematical 
logic. Russell sees logical atomism as a patient, precise, and dry method of philosophizing, and 
to identify the method of sound philosophizing with the new mathematical logic: 
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It [the new logic] has, in my opinion, introduced the same kind of advance into 
philosophy as Galileo introduced into physics, making it possible at last to see what kinds 
of problems may be capable of solution, and what kinds must be abandoned as beyond 
human powers. And where a solution appears possible, the new logic provides a method 
which enables us to obtain results that do not merely embody personal idiosyncrasies, but 
must command the assent of all who are competent to form an opinion. (OKEW: 59)  
 
Therefore every advance in knowledge robs philosophy of some of the problems which 
formerly it had, and if there is any truth, if there is any value in the kind of procedure of 
mathematical logic, it will follow that a number of problems which had belonged to 
philosophy will have ceased to belong to philosophy and will belong to science…It 
[applying mathematical logic to philosophical problems] makes it [philosophy] dry, 
precise, methodical… (PLA: 243)   
 
Let us summarize what we have found. Despite having only used the phrase ‘logical atomism’ in 
March 1911, some historical facts are accurately reported by Russell’s remark that he became a 
logical atomist in 1899-1900. First, he learned the new logic. He immediately applied it, and in a 
sense used logical atomism’s method—the new logic—before he ever coined the term ‘logical 
atomism’. This makes good sense if logic is central to logical atomism. And Russell indeed 
claims logic is central to logical atomism. This is historical fact (2) above. 
Second, the centrality of logic is critical to understanding why Russell believes the 
method of logical atomism—the new logic—can help philosophy become scientific. Taking his 
cue from the revolutionary impact of nineteenth-century mathematics, Russell believed that 
making logic central to philosophizing would make philosophy itself scientific, and distinctly 
scientific in a way that was not feasible without making logic central. This is historical fact (3) 
above.  
 Now interpreting logical atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes fits these two 
historical facts about logical atomism quite poorly. Consider fact (2). One could argue for the 
existence of atomic facts, an ontology including logical simples, and acquaintance epistemology 
without applying mathematical logic in, and making logic central to, philosophy.49 One does not 
need to engage in much logic at all to advocate for these views. And a search for acquaintance-
complexes is in no sense “precise, dry, methodical” as the new logic is. A search for 
acquaintance-complexes is not a “science of the possible.” And it does not make philosophy 
“indistinguishable from logic as that word has come to be used.” One cannot be a logical atomist, 
according to Russell, without applying logic in, and making logic central to, philosophy. But you 
could be a logical atomist without doing this on the dominant interpretation of logical atomism. 
The dominant view thus insufficiently accounts for the logical methods of logical atomism and 
for the general use of logic in philosophy, which Russell insists is vital to logical atomism.  
Now consider fact (3). The dominant interpretation poorly explains the supposedly 
scientific aspect of logical atomism that was inspired by its logico-mathematical origins, 
including its genesis from nineteenth-century mathematical work that Russell encountered in 
1899-1900 before he ever adopted the acquaintance theory and views about simples that we find 
in the 1910s. Indeed, logical atomism is older than Russell’s acquaintance epistemology and 
ontology of sense-data and relations, and it survives their demise. What does not change in this 
period is Russell’s firm belief in the vital importance of logic for making philosophy “scientific”. 
 
49 Pears held that Wittgenstein did just that in reasoning a priori for positing simples (Pears, 1985, 5-6). 
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Russell held that nineteenth-century mathematics did make philosophy of mathematics scientific, 
and logical atomism was supposed to make all philosophy similarly “dry, precise, methodical”, 
as logic is. This makes sense of Russell’s claim to be a logical atomist from 1899-1900 onward. 
And making logic central to logical atomism accounts for why Russell thought that the 
introduction of the new logic was an “advance” in philosophy rivaling Galileo’s advance in 
physics. On the other hand, viewing logical atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes 
produces a philosophy that is not at all scientific in Russell’s sense. On the dominant 
interpretation, logical atomism is not piecemeal or progressive: it is a typical traditional 
philosophy that does not merit any of the remarkable claims about progress Russell asserts for it. 
Viewing logical atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes does not fit the actual 
development of logical atomism from 1899-1900 onward through various texts. Even limiting 
ourselves to Russell's works after his 1911 “Analytic Realism”, where he first used the phrase 
‘logical atomism’, helps very little: Russell repeatedly points to nineteenth-century mathematical 
work in discussing what led him the philosophy of logical atomism.  
Understanding logical atomism as the search for acquaintance-complexes fails to explain 
why Russell traced the origins of logical atomism to mathematical logic. Simply put, the age of 
logical atomism and its reliance on mathematical logic on this interpretation are inexplicably 
accidental.50 As I hope the foregoing summary shows, this reading conflicts with Russell’s 
explicit statements in his 1918 logical atomism lectures, in his 1924 “Logical Atomism”, in his 
1914 Our Knowledge of the External World, in his 1914 “On Scientific Method in Philosophy”, 
and in his 1911 “Analytic Realism”, all of which are logical atomist works, and with Russell's 
intellectual autobiography. It thus conflicts with an abundance of evidence as to the logico-
mathematical origins of logical atomism. The dominant interpretation is a bad history. 
 
4 Direct Textual Evidence Against the Dominant Reading 
 
Interpreting logical atomism as a search for acquaintance complexes also conflicts 
directly with the text of the lectures. Near the beginning of Lecture IV Russell remarks: 
 
I think one might describe philosophical logic, the philosophical portion of logic which is 
the portion that I am concerned with in these lectures since Christmas [1917], as an 
inventory, or if you like a more humble word, a “Zoo” containing all the different forms 
that facts may have...In logic you are concerned with the forms of facts, with getting hold 
of the different sorts of facts, different logical sorts of facts, that there are in the world. 
(PLA: 191)51  
 
 
50 Urmson, for instance, says “this new, rich logic” merely “suggested” logical atomism (Urmson, 1956, 7). 
51 Russell goes even further in his 1914 Our Knowledge: “Logic, we may say, consists of two parts. The first part 
investigates what propositions are and what forms they may have; this part enumerates the different kinds of atomic 
propositions, of molecular propositions, of general propositions, and so on. The second part consists of certain 
supremely general propositions, which assert the truth of all propositions of certain forms. This second part merges 
into pure mathematics, whose propositions all turn out, on analysis, to be such general formal truths. The first part, 
which merely enumerates forms, is the more difficult, and philosophically the more important; and it is the recent 
progress in this first part, more than anything else, that has rendered a truly scientific discussion of many 
philosophical problems possible.” (OKEW: 57-58; see also SMP: 65-66) 
P a g e  20 | 24 
 
Now I submit that Russell does exactly logic, as he describes logic above, in the 1918 lectures on 
logical atomism. Just look at the table of contents for the logical atomism lectures:52  
 
I. Facts and Propositions 
II. Particulars, Predicates, and Relations 
III. Atomic and Molecular Propositions 
IV. Propositions and Facts with More than One Verb; Beliefs, Etc. 
V. General Propositions and Existence 
VI. Descriptions and Incomplete Symbols 
VII. The Theory of Types and Symbolism: Classes 
VIII. Excursus into Metaphysics: What There Is (PLA: 155)  
 
To see that the logical atomism lectures are a work of logic, let us expand on its table of 
contents. Lecture I introduces facts and the notion of forms of facts.53 Lecture II analyses atomic 
facts and atomic propositions.54 Lecture III discusses the purported need for molecular facts.55 
Lecture IV treats the need for belief-facts.56 Lecture V concerns existence facts and general 
facts.57 Lectures VI and VII deal with logic itself. Lecture VI deals with incomplete symbols.58 
Lecture VII concerns type theory.59 Thus, all but his last lecture deal with logical forms of facts 
or with logic itself. That is why Russell styles Lecture VIII an “excursus” and also why he begins 
Lecture VIII by remarking that it breaks from the themes of the seven earlier lectures: 
 
I come now to the last lecture of this course, and I propose briefly to point to a few of the 
morals that are to be gathered from what has gone before, in the way of suggesting the 
bearing of the doctrines that I have been advocating upon various problems of 
metaphysics. I have dwelt hitherto upon what one may call philosophical grammar, and I 
am afraid I have had to take you through a good many very dry and dusty regions in the 
course of that investigation, but I think the importance of philosophical grammar is very 
much greater than it is generally thought to be. (PLA: 234) 
 
Logic, or “philosophical grammar”, is again critical to scientific philosophy as Russell 
understands it: that is why he spends seven of eight lectures on logical atomism dealing with 
 
52 Here I am taking inspiration from the tree-readers of the Tractatus (Bazzocchi, 2014, IV-VII). 
53 “There are a great many different kinds of facts, and we shall be concerned in later lectures with a certain amount 
of classification of facts.” (PLA: 164) 
54 “I propose to begin today the analysis of facts and propositions, for in a way the chief thesis that I have to 
maintain is the legitimacy of analysis…” (PLA: 169) 
55 “I do not see any reason to suppose that there is a complexity in the facts corresponding to these molecular 
propositions…” (PLA: 187) 
56 “Today we have to deal with a new form of fact…Now I want to point out today that the facts that occur when 
one believes or wishes or wills have a different logical form from the atomic facts containing a single verb which I 
dealt with in my second lecture.” (PLA: 191) 
57 “We have such propositions as “All men are mortal” and “Some men are Greeks.” But you have not only such 
propositions; you also have such facts, and that, of course, is where you get back to the inventory of the world: that, 
in addition to particular facts…there are also general facts and existence-facts…” (PLA: 206) 
58 “I am proposing to deal this time with the subject of descriptions, and what I call “incomplete symbols”, and the 
existence of described individuals.” (PLA: 211) 
59 “I come now to the proper subject of my lecture, but shall have to deal with it rather hastily. It was to explain the 
theory of types and the definition of classes.” (PLA: 226) 
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logic in the sense we saw above. This point is worth emphasizing. The dominant reading would 
suggest that logical atomists are concerned with discovering the logical simples and arguing for 
an acquaintance epistemology. Russell’s practice in these lectures, save for a one-lecture 
“excursus”, is instead to consider what the logical forms of facts are. Indeed, his discussion of 
particulars and relations in Lecture II is explicitly concerned with the logical form of atomic 
facts, and Russell tells us that he is not interested in what particulars there are, if any, but only in 
the logical characterization of constituents of atomic facts. Rather than search for acquaintance-
complexes, as we would expect on the dominant interpretation, Russell’s practice in the logical 
atomism lectures is to do logic. The dominant interpretation gets logical atomist practice wrong. 
It may help to clarify this point to consider why Russell believes that mathematical logic 
is critical to scientific philosophy as Russell understands it. Russell holds that one cannot form 
the requisite stockpile of logical forms to attack philosophical problems without a robust logic: 
 
Now I want to say that if you wish to test such a theory as that of neutral monism, if you 
wish to discover whether it is true or false, you cannot hope to get any distance with your 
problem unless you have at your fingers’ end the theory of logic that I have been talking 
of. (PLA: 242, see also 235) 
 
Russell is not equivocal on this issue: mathematical logic is critical to logical atomism. The 
reason is that we can hardly make philosophical progress in examining a view without a large 
stockpile of logical forms or without a powerful logic. The logical examination of a theory is 
impossibly hindered by a limited logic.  
 The answer to this limitation is to create a stockpile of logical forms of facts using the 
powerful new logic. And this is precisely what Russell does, as he tells us when he describes his 
subject in the logical atomism lectures as an inventory of logical forms that facts may have. The 
logical atomism lectures are a work describing a search for logical forms, not a search for 
acquaintance-complexes. It is no accident that Russell calls the logical atomism lectures his 
“logic lectures” both in correspondence.60 Even in his appointment diary, Russell refers to the 
logical atomism lectures as “LL” for “logic lectures”.61  
 
 
60 In a 21 May 1918 letter, Russell writes, “To P. Jourdain…Is he going to print 2 of my logic lectures in July and 2 
each subsequent quarter? I hope so.” (Griffin, 2001: #313) Jourdain was then editor of The Monist, where the logical 
atomism lectures were published. 
61 Thanks to the Bertrand Russell Archives in the William Ready Division of Research Collections, McMaster 
University Library, for permission to use this photograph. 
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Figure 1. Russell’s appointment diary for 20-22 January 1918 
 
There is no denying what is firmly and uniformly supported by documents contemporaneous 
with and the text of the logical atomism lectures: the logical atomism lectures are a logic book.62 
Above all, the text of the logical atomism lectures focus on, and are organized around, the 
search for logical forms: this is the stockpiling of logical forms of facts that Russell playfully 
describes as the inventory of a logical zoo. The text thus conflicts with understanding logical 
atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes, even when we confine ourselves to the text and 
ignoring the wider historical context. Having a robust logic, on the dominant reading, is at best 
just a helpful means for more effectively rendering the truth-conditions of statements in terms of 
acquaintance-complexes. But this is contrary to the logical atomist practice that we find in the 
lectures. What Russell in fact makes the center of logical atomism, namely, a robust logic as a 
means of stockpiling logical forms of facts and logical theses for use in testing possibilities, is 
exhibited in his practice of searching for logical forms of facts. He does not search for 
acquaintance-complexes. Again, on the dominant interpretation, the connection of logic to 
logical atomism is, if fortuitous, accidental. But what we find in the text is logic being used 
throughout the essential work of classifying logical forms. 
Defenders of the dominant interpretation have actually seen this as a virtue of their view. 
Urmson, for example, says in his 1956 treatment of logical atomism that we can neglect all the 
“advanced and difficult” parts of Russell’s logic: 
 
 
62 In a 17 April 1918 letter, Russell writes, “I wish to write two works concurrently, one to be called “Introduction to 
Modern Logic” or some such title, more or less on the lines of the lectures I gave you before and after Christmas…” 
(Thompson, 1975: 18) 
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Since the metaphysics is thus dependent on the logic, it is clearly indispensable to have 
some sort of understanding of what sort of logic it is and of the concepts it employs if we 
are to understand the metaphysics. For our purposes the more advanced and difficult parts 
of the logic are luckily less important than the most simple and no reference need be 
made to them. (Urmson, 1956, 7-8)  
 
For Urmson, the only necessary parts are those that help us “to understand the metaphysics”, and 
not any parts, if any, that are specially necessary to understand the logical form. 
Urmson then discusses truth-functional connectives and truth-functional tautologies and 
contradictions, omitting quantification theory (Urmson, 1956, §2.B). He then says that logicians 
speak “indifferently about all statements whatever their content or structure” (Urmson, 1956, 8). 
This suggests his view of logical atomism confines the logic of logical atomism to a system of 
propositional logic in which logical truths are all tautologies, and all non-logical truths are 
atomic statements, unlike, say, the statement ‘all humans are mortal’. Urmson writes: 
 
…the formal logician regards himself as supplied with an indefinite number of 
propositional variables, p, q, r, &c.; since he does not inquire into their structure we may 
say that they are simple relative to his system. Since he has no logical means of 
determining the truth or falsehood of the constituents [statements] he limits his interest to 
those of the functions which can be recognized to be true or false by logical methods—
the tautologies and contradictions. Since it is the tautologies which are of importance for 
research into the foundations of mathematics, this suits him perfectly…So much must 
suffice as an explanation of the ideas of elementary logic which were adapted for use in 
the metaphysics of logical atomism. (Urmson, 1956, 11; see also 14)  
 
This conflicts with the fact that Russell’s logic is far richer than this, and the fact that logical 
atomist inventory of logical forms goes beyond tautologies and contradictions. Russell writes: 
 
The technical methods of mathematical logic, as developed in this book [Principia], seem 
to me very powerful, and capable of providing a new instrument for the discussion of 
many problems that have hitherto remained subject to philosophical vagueness. (LA: 163) 
 
The elimination of “philosophical vagueness” is aided by the fact that the language of Principia 
shows “at a glance” the logical form of the facts involved in a statement being true or false (PLA: 
176). But confining ourselves to a logic as weak as propositional logic, as Urmson does, or even 
to a first-order logic, destroys all the examples from Principia of logical atomism’s success. 
Russell cites, as examples of logical atomism’s success, the analyses of number (PLA: 234), 
classes (PLA: 228), matter (PLA: 235-236), definite descriptions (LA: 165-166), series and 
ordinals (LA: 166), ordinary objects (PLA: 236-237), points and instants (LA: 166), matter (LA: 
166-167), and mind (LA: 167). Propositional logic is far too weak to recover the analyses given 
in Principia of purely mathematical notions like number and class. And a system too inadequate 
to recover the analyses in Principia cannot be taken what Russell meant in describing logic as 
central to logical atomism. This weighs heavily against Urmson’s indication of propositional 
logic as giving the essentials of what Russell had in mind. And it more generally suggests that 
the dominant interpretation, which at best accounts for Russell’s examples of logical atomist 
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analyses as happy accidents only loosely connected with the search for acquaintance-complexes, 
has gotten something deeply wrong in its interpretation of logical atomism.  
 And, for someone who is, supposedly, deeply committed to searching for acquaintance-
complexes, Russell is remarkably unconcerned with justifying the existence of simples or with 
sketching a foundationally-structured justification tree for human knowledge.63 Russell is far 
more concerned in the logical atomism lectures with classifying logical forms of facts. The 
dominant interpretation fails to explain why Russell focuses on logical forms throughout the 
lectures. The dominant interpretation does not explain why Russell views logic as “what is 
fundamental in philosophy” or why Russell thinks logical atomism will make philosophy 
scientific.64 It does not even fit Russell’s description of these lectures as his “logic lectures.” 
The dominant interpretation of logical atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes, 
though alluring, is the sort of traditional philosophical view that Russell explicitly contrasts with 
his own. It conflicts with the logical focus, especially the logical atomist practice of searching for 
logical forms, that we find in the text of the 1918 logical atomism lectures. The dominant 
interpretation is a historically inaccurate and textually inadequate view of logical atomism. 
 
5 Russell’s Logical Atomism 
 
Interpreting logical atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes composed of ontological 
simples has inspired rich scholarly discussion. But the dominant interpretation: 
 
a. fails to connect its reading to Russell’s remarks about logical atomism and its origins; 
b. fails to incorporate Russell’s view that a powerful logic is critical to the view; 
c. fails to match Russell’s logical atomist practice in, and the content of, the lectures. 
 
This historical evidence shows the dominant reading is wrong. What, then, is logical atomism?  
Logical atomism is what we might call a ‘logic-first and logic-last’ philosophy (SMP: 
65). A logical atomist starts by giving a logical system (LA: 162). A vital test of a proposed 
logical system will be its adequacy to certain data that we accept as true (LA: 163). A 
philosophically fruitful logical atomism will require an expressively adequate logic to generate a 
large variety of logical forms (OKEW: 42-43). Logical atomism thus requires a higher-order 
logical framework. It is the logical atomist’s use of a powerful logic that makes logical atomist 
philosophy distinctively scientific in Russell’s sense (AR: 139). Where logic does not settle a 
philosophical issue, the possibilities are open (SMP: 72-73). And for traditional philosophers that 
find Russell’s logical atomism and its logic-heavy practice disappointing or difficult, Russell has 
some unsympathetic advice: “acquire a taste for mathematics” (PLA: 243-244). 
 
 
63 A case in point is Russell’s casual suggestion that there may not be logical simples (PLA: 180). Pears explains this 
away as Russell’s being confused (Pears, 1985, 4). Pears thus squares what Russell actually believed with the text. 
But more to the point is that this interpretation poorly fits the text: for if logical atomism is crucially committed to an 
ontology with logical simples (knowable by acquaintance), Russell is either unaware of this fact or far too casual in 
entertaining an ontology without logical simples. 
64 “I hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and that schools should be characterized rather by their 
logic than by their metaphysic.” (LA: 162) 
